Lynn C. Stephenson v. John E. Warner And Steve F. Greenwood : Respondentts Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Lynn C. Stephenson v. John E. Warner And Steve F.
Greenwood : Respondentts Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Milton T. Harmon; Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn C.
StephensonLeonard H. Russon; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Steve F. Greenwood
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Stephenson v. Warner, No. 15333 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/768
r~ ~UPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN C. STEPHENSON, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN E. WARNER and 
STEVE F. GREENWOOD, 
Defendants and 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 15,333 
RESPONDENTtS BRIEF 
Appeal from the Directed Verdict 
Of the District Court for Juab County 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
MILT.JN T. HARMON 
36 South Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN . 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-Responde 
Steve F. Greenwood 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Lynn C. Stephenson FILED 
JAN - 5 1978 
.,.._.. ... ------------------------·---·-
Clerk, Supra111a Comt, Utali 
I 
I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN C. STEPHENSON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
JOHN E. WARNER and 
STEVE F. GREENWOOD, 
Defendants and 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 15,333 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Directed Verdict 
Of the District Court for Juab County 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge 
MIL TON T. HARMON 
36 South Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant-Responde 
Steve F. Greenwood 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Lynn C. Stephenson 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT . 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DIRECTING THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
RESPONDENT GREENWOOD AND AGAINST 
APPELLANT . . . . . 
POINT II. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEPHI 
CITY ORDINANCES BEFORE THE COURT; 
NOR IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
RESPONDENT GREENWOOD VIOLATED ANY 
NEPHI CITY ORDINANCES . . . . . 
A. There is No Evidence of the 
Nephi City Ordinances Before 
The Court . . . . . . . . . 
B. Contrary to Claims of Appellant, 
Respondent Greenwood Did Not 
Create a Nuisance, Nor Did He 
Violate Ordinances of Nephi City 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX . 
i 
1 
1 
2 
2 
8 
8 
17 
17 
22 
26 
27 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Larson v. Calder's Park Co., 54 Ut. 325, 
108 p. 559 (1919) ....... . 
Montoya v. Berthana Investment Corp., 
21 Ut.2d 37, 439 P.2d 853 .... 
Reams v. Taylor, 31 Ut. 288, 87 P. 1089 
Wilson v. Woodruff, 65 Ut. 118, 235 P. 368 
(1925) . . . . . . ..... 
14' 15 
14' 15 
16 
. .... 12, 13, 14 
15' 16 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Sec·. 771 12 
49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 780 11 
49 Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 786 10 
Nephi City Ordinances 8' 17' 19 
21, 2 2' 25 
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 355 10 
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 356 11, 13 
Uniform Building Code 8' 17' 18 
19' 21, 22 
23, 24, 25 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 44 20' 21 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 9 (3) 19 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 10 c 4) 20 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 68 20 
ii Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNN C. STEPHENSON, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, Case No. 15,333 
JOHN E. WARNER and 
STEVE F. GREENWOOD, 
Defendants and 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
Appellant, Lynn C. Stephenson, while he was cleaning a service 
station floor with gasoline at his place of employment. Appellant 
sued his employer, John E. Warner, who carried no workmen's 
compensation insurance. Appellant also sued Respondent, Steve 
F. Greenwood, who owned and had leased the service station to 
John E. Warner. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury before the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, Fourth Judicial District Court Judge. At 
the end of the evidence, and upon all parties resting, and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Respondent having moved for a directed verdict, the Court 
directed a verdict in favor of Respondent, Steve F. Greenwoo, 
The case against the employer, John E. Warner, was submitted 
to a jury, which returned a verdict against the employer and 
in favor of Appellant, and awarded damages. 
The Appellant does not appeal this judgment agains 
his employer. The Appellant appeals as to the directed verd. 
granted to Respondent Greenwood. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Steve F. Greenwood requests this Court 
to affirm the judgment on the directed verdict rendered in h 
favor by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is inaccurate and 
misleading. Therefore, Respondent, Steve F. Greenwood, is 
compelled to submit the following Statement of Facts. 
On May 6, 1972, Plaintiff-Appellant Lynn C. Stephe 
was employed by Defendant John E. Warner at John's Conoco 
Service Station in Nephi, Utah. (T. 68) On that date, Step 
was using gasoline to clean the service station floor when a 
explosion and fire occurred, injuring him. (T. 117-119) He 
- 2-
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blames the accident on a car wash water heater, which he claims 
was positioned incorrectly in the station. 
The service station in question was leased and operated 
by Warner. (T. 51-52, 77) He had leased the station from 
Defendant-Respondent Steve F. Greenwood. (T. 77) Greenwood 
was the owner of the station, but he was not the owner of the car 
washing equipment or its hot water heater. (T. 40, 53) These 
items belonged to Warner. (T. 80- 81, 53) The relationship 
between Warner and Greenwood was simply one of lessee-lessor. 
(T. 77, 40) Greenwood's only interest was rent. (T. 40) 
At the commencement of the Warner lease, the service 
station consisted of an office, a supply room, two lubrication 
bays, and an open "addition" attached to one end of the building, 
which was used for car washing purposes. (Ex. P-2) The supply 
room housed the car wash hot water heater. The supply room floor 
was 6 inches higher than the rest of the station (T. 93, Ex. D-3) 
and was separated from the lubrication bays, as well as the rest 
of the station, by a wall. (Ex. P-2, T. 63, 84) This supply 
room wall was removed by Warner prior to the fire. (T. 63-65) 
Stephenson helped Warner tear down the wall. (T. 65, 86) 
Warner had asked Greenwood for permission to remove the wall, and 
Greenwood had given it. (T. 63-64) However, Greenwood left 
- 3 -
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the entire matter in Warner's hands. (T. 85-86) Greenwood~ 
not present when the wall was removed, nor did he visit the 
premises after its removal. (T. 65-66) 
Warner stored "full" cans of oil and cleaners in 
the supply area. Such cleaners were removed to other areas c 
the station when used. (T. 84-85) Greenwood never observed 
Warner stored in the storeroom. (T. 58) It is unknown what 
the prior lessee had stored in the said supply room. 
In addition to the water heater, located in the sut 
room area, a compressor was located above the first lubricat1 
bay near the furnace, at ceiling level. (Ex. P-2) Also, it 
was common for Stephenson and Warner to throw their cigarettt 
on the station floor. (T. 87) 
At the time of the accident, Stephenson was cleanir 
the floor of the first lubrication bay with gasoline when t~ 
explosion and fire occurred. (T. 117-119) 
Stephenson does not know what caused the fire. (T. 
Warner does not know what caused the fire. ( T . 8 8) The fin 
chief found no physical evidence as to the cause of the fire 
(_T. 98) The source of ignition was unknown to the fire chier 
but he stated it could have been a cigarette on the floor, e 
compressor near the ceiling, or the said water heater. (T. 
-101) He was of the opinion, based upon what others had tol 
- 4-
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him, that the gasoline fumes were ignited by the water heater. 
(T. 98-99) He testified that it was dangerous to clean with 
gasoline inside such buildings, since gasoline fumes can spread 
throughout the building to a source of ignition. (T. 102) 
Stephenson had prior knowledge of gasoline and its 
dangerous propensities, and testified that he knew not to use 
gasoline to clean near water heaters. (T. 135-136, 139-140) 
He was aware of the said water heater and its pilot light prior 
to the fire. (T. 140) 
After the accident, Stephenson filed suit against his 
employer, Warner. Warner carried no workmen's compensation 
insurance. Stephenson also filed suit against the landlord, 
Greenwood. Stephenson claims that Greenwood was the owner 
of the water heater in question, and that he was negligent in 
regard to its location and in allowing Warner to remove the 
wall that separated the supply room containing the water heater 
from the rest of the station. (Appellant's Brief) 
Greenwood was not the owner of the car washing 
equipment or its water heater. (T. 39, 40, 81) The water 
heater in question, and its associated car washing equipment, 
had originally been purchased and installed in the station by 
the prior lessee, Joe Allen. (T. 28, 38) The said equipment 
-5-
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was installed by the company that sold Allen the equipment. 
(T. 28) The heater was installed in the supply room which, a 
that time, was separated from the rest of the service station 
by a wall. It was this wall which was removed by Warner and 
Stephenson. (Ex. P-2, T. 63-65, 86) The supply room floor~ 
6 inches higher than the rest of the station. (T. 93, Ex. D-
The rest of the car washing equipment was installed in the op 
"addition" at the side of the station. Allen had requested 
that Greenwood build the said "addition" for Allen's car 
washing equipment. (T. 38) Greenwood built the addition and 
charged Allen additional $40.00 a month rent for the same. 
(T. 27-28, 38-39) The car washing equipment, including its 
heater, was installed after the "addition" had been built. 
(T. 106) This was some time after December 22, 1970. (Ex. 
Allen had purchased the said car washing equipment 
by making a loan at the bank. (T. 38-39) However, the bank 
would not loan Allen the money without a co-signer on the not 
(T. 39) Greenwood co-signed the note to allow Allen to make 
his loan. (T. 39, Ex. P-1) Greenwood had no ownership inter 
in the said equipment. (T. 39) Greenwood has never operated 
the equipment. (T. 37) 
When Joe Allen died, Warner took over the station a 
lessee. (T. 52) The terms of the lease were the same as the 
had been between Allen and Greenwood. (T. 52) Warner purcha 
-6-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the car washing equipment, with its water heater. (T. 39, 53-54) 
Warner purchased the said car washing equipment and heater 
by paying off Allen's note at the bank and making a new loan. 
(T. 54) However, the bank would not make a loan to Warner unless 
he had a co-signer on the note. (T. 39, 54) Greenwood co-signed 
the note so that Warner could make his loan. (T. 54) Greenwood 
had no ownership in the said equipment. (T. 40, 81) The equip-
ment was solely Warner's. (T. 80-81) Warner testified that 
the equipment was his alone, (T. 80-81) and that he could have 
moved the said equipment at any time to another location. 
(T. 80-81) When Warner subsequently gave up the station, he 
sold the equipment to the new lessee. (T. 45, 81) When the new 
lessee failed to make payments on the said car washing equipment, 
Warner personally locked the said-equipment with a lock and 
key and would not release the same until the payments were made 
and his equity paid in full. (T. 81-82) 
At no time during the trial did Stephenson offer 
into evidence city codes or building ordinances. At the end 
of all evidence, Greenwood moved for a directed verdict. (T. 158) 
Stephenson then requested the Trial Court to take judicial 
notice of old Nephi ordinances and building codes. No testimony 
or evidence was offered in regard thereto. (Trial Transcript.) 
-7-
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The Trial Court granted Defendant-Respondent 
Greenwood's motion for directed verdict. (T. 167) 
The Trial Court then submitted the matter to the 
jury, which returned a verdict in favor of Stephenson and 
against his employer, Warner, and awarded damages accordingly 
(T. 184, R. 155) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DIRECTING 
THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GREENWOOD AND AGAINST 
APPELLANT. 
Stephenson claims that the landlord, Greenwood, she 
be liable, upon the grounds that the water heater in question 
was situated in violation of Nephi City Ordinances. He furtt 
claims that the 1964 Uniform Building Code is applicable, and 
required a flame or pilot light to be at least 24 inches abo1 
the floor in rooms where flammables were stored or used. The 
Nephi City Ordinances are not in evidence and are not applica 
as will be discussed in Point II. 
However, even assuming that the ordinances and buil 
code apply, as claimed by Appellant, the evidence clearly she 
without question of fact, that the water heater was purchasec 
and installed by the prior lessee, Joe Allen, and at that tirr 
was not in violation of the said city ordinances or alleged 
- 8 -
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building code relied upon by Appellant. Furthermore, when 
the station was leased to Warner, Warner purchased the water 
heater and car washing equipment, and the said water heater 
was not in violation of the said city ordinances or building 
code at that time. 
When the service station was leased to Warner, the 
water heater was located in a separate room from the rest of 
the station. The said room was separated from the rest of the 
station )2z ~wall. Furthermore, the floor of the said room 
was 6 inches higher than the rest of the station. Subsequently, 
the lessee, Warner, asked Greenwood for permission to tear 
down the wall which separated the said room from the rest of 
the station. Greenwood gave Warner permission to remove the 
wall, but left the entire matter in Warner's hands. It was 
Warner who, with the help of Appellant Stephenson, tore down 
the wall. 
With the wall removed, the supply room then became 
part of the larger room housing the two lubrication bays, as 
well as what once had been the supply room, with its water 
heater, 
Since the removal of the wall was left up to the 
lessee, Warner, and since Warner was the one that removed 
the said wall, he had the responsibility to assure that such 
alterations did not result in a violation of the city ordinances 
-9-
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or building code. If by removal of the wall, the water 
heater became subject to the code by then being located in 
the same room where flammables were used or stored, and there· 
fore was required to be 24 inches off the floor as alleged by 
Appellant, it was the responsibility of the lessee, Warner, 
to adjust the heater accordingly. 
Greenwood did not participate or observe the remova: 
of the wall, nor did he visit the premises after the change 
was made. Furthermore, Greenwood had no knowledge of what 
Warner stored in the supply area. 
Sec. 786: 
As stated in 49 Am. Jur. Zd, Landlord and Tenants, 
A landlord is not deemed to be the principal 
of his tenant, and he is not responsible 
for his tenant's torts, active or negligent, 
or for his tenant's failure to keep the 
premises in repair. The landlord is not 
liable for injuries, to a person on the 
premises in the right of the tenant, caused 
by a defect in the premises which results 
from an act of the tenant. 
The general law is well stated in the Restatment of 
Torts, Sec. 355, which reads as follows: 
... A lessor of land is not subject to 
liability to his lessee or others upon the land 
with the consent of the lessee or sub-lessee 
for physical harm caused by any dangerous condi 
which comes into existence after the lessee has 
taken possession. 
-10-
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However, even if the alleged defect had existed 
at the time the premises were leased to Warner, the lessor, Green-
wood, still could not be held liable. The general law is well 
stated in Restatement of Torts, Sec. 356, which reads as follows: 
A lessor of land is not liable to his 
lessee or to others on the land for physical 
harm caused by any dangerous condition, 
whether natural or artificial, which existed 
when the lessee took possession. 
49 Am. Jr. Zd, Sec. 780, Landlord and Tenant, page 
722, states it this way: 
At common law, subject to certain exceptions, 
the occupier or tenant, and not the land-
lord, is liable for injuries to a third 
person, on or off the premises, caused by 
the condition or use of the demised premises. 
It is the well-settled general rule that 
the duties and liabilities of the landlord 
to persons on the leased premises by the 
consent of the tenant are the same as those 
owed to the tenant himself; for this purpose 
they stand in his shoes. This rule applies 
to the tenant's wife, child, or other members 
of the tenant's family. Where the tenant 
has no redress against the landlord, those 
on the premises in the tenant's rights are 
likewise barred. Visitors, customers, 
servants, employees, invitees, and licensees 
in general of the tenant are on the premises 
as guests, etc. of the tenant and not of 
the landlord. Whatever rights such invitation 
or license from the lessee may confer as 
against such lessee, it can, as against 
the lessor, give no greater right than the 
lessee himself has. Accordingly, it is a 
general rule that the landlord is not liable 
to persons on the premises in the right of 
the tenant for injuries from defects in the 
condition of the demised premises. This 
-11-
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rule has been deemed to extend even to 
structural defects. Thus, a lessor is not, 
as a general rule, responsible for injuries 
to third persons in privity with the tenant 
which are caused by failure to keep or put the 
demised premises in good repair--in other 
words, for injuries caused by defects arising 
before or during the term from failure to 
make repairs. These rules apply to the 
tenant's employees, even though the property 
is leased for a business purpose .. 
The same annotator, at Sec. 771, states the followi 
while citing a Utah case as one of numerous authorities: 
The logical conclusion from the principle 
that the landlord is under no implied 
obligation as to the condition of the 
demised premises or as to the repair of 
defects therein is that the landlord is not 
responsible to the tenant for injuries to 
p.erson or property caused by defects in 
the demised premises where the landlord 
had not made any warranty or contract as 
to the condition of the demised premises 
or as to the repair of defects and is 
guilty of no willful wrong or fraud. 
(Citing numerous cases, including Wilson 
v. Woodruff, 65 Ut. 118, 235 P. 368.) 
In Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, a Utah case, the defE 
were owners of a two-story brick building in the business sec 
of Salt Lake City. There was evidence that the east wall of 
the building was defectively constructed. That portion of tr 
building collapsed, causing injury to the lessee. This Hono1 
Court stated: 
The general proposition is well settled 
that in the absence of warranty, deceit, 
-12-
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this way: 
or fraud on the part of the landlord, 
the lessee takes the risk of the quality 
of the premises, and cannot make the 
landlord answerable for any injuries 
sustained by him during his occupancy by 
reason of the defective condition of the 
premises or their faulty construction 
The Utah Supreme Court further stated: 
We think the evidence in this case clearly 
shows that the injuries sustained resulted 
from defects in the premises demised to 
plaintiff, which risk he assumed when he 
entered under his lease. 
The Restatement of Torts, Sec. 356, states it 
. . . A lessor of land is not liable to his 
lessee or to others on the land for physical 
harm caused by any dangerous condition, 
whether natural or artificial, which 
existed when the lessee took possession. 
Therefore, even if the alleged defect had existed at 
the time the premises were leased to Warner by Greenwood, 
Greenwood still would not be liable. However, such is not the 
case. When the premises were leased to Warner, no defect existed 
even under the ordinances and building codes relied upon by 
the Appellant. If there was any violation of such ordinances 
and codes, such came into being only after the lessee, with 
the help of the Appellant, Stephenson, altered the leased 
premises in the removal of the wall and door. 
-13-
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The Appellant, in his brief, claims that Greenwood 
created a nuisance, and relied upon the case of Larson v. 
Calder's Park Co., 54 Ut. 325, 108 p. 559. There, a building 
had been used for eight years as a shooting gallery, and had 
.s. 
been a dangerous nuisance for many years. It was common for 
bullets to pass through the cracks and holes in the wall of 
the building, and such facts were known to the landlord. Wh~ 
the landlord leased the premises, he did so with the knowledhere 
that the building was a nuisance, that the public passed in 
back of the building, and that the new tenant would continue 
to use the building as a shooting gallery and, therefore, the 
would be a continuation of the nuisance. However, such cas~ 
has no application to the case at bar. Ours is not a case of 
nuisance, but even if it were, there was no nuisance when the 
car washing equipment was installed by Joe Allen, nor when t! 1~ 
premises were leased to Warner. If a nuisance ever existed, 
it was after Warner and Stephenson tore down the supply room 
wall, therein exposing the heater flame to the rest of the 
service station, including the lubrication areas. 
Furthermore, Larson v. Calder's Park Co., supra, 
preceded Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, and Montoya v. Berthana 
Investment Corp., 21 Ut. 2d 37, 439 P.2d 853. It will be 
recalled in Wilson v. Woodruff, supra, that the defective 
-14-
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1101-1102 
Chapter 11 
REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUP F OCCUPANCIES 
NOTE: Tables in Chapter 11 appear at the end of the Chapter. 
Group F Occupancies Defined 
Sec. 1101. Group F Occupancies shall be: 
Division I. GasoHgc §ery~e stations, storage garages where no re-
pair work is done except exc ange ot parts and maintenance requiring 
no open flame, welding, or the use of highly flammable liquids. 
Division 2. Wholesale and retail stores, office buildings, drinking 
and dining establishments having an occupant load of less than 100, 
printing plants, municipal police and fire stations, factories and work-
shops using materials not highly flammable or combustible, storage and 
sales rooms for combustible goods, paint stores without bulk handling. 
(Sec Section 402 for definition of Assembly Buildings.) 
Buildings or portions of buildings having rooms used for educational 
purposes beyond the 12th grade with less than 50 occupants in any 
room. 
Di vision 3. Aircraft hangars where. no repair work is.done except 
exchange of parts and maintenance requiring no open flame, welding, 
or the use of highly flammable liquids. 
Open parking garages. 
Heliports. 
For occupancy separations see Table No. 5-B. 
For occupant load see Section 3301. 
Construction, Height, and Allowable Area 
Sec. II 02. (a) General. Buildings or parts of buildings classed in 
Croup F because of the use or character of the occupancy shall be 
limited to the types of construction set forth in Tables No. 5-C and No . 
.S·D and shall not exceed, in area or height, the limits specified in 
Sections .SOS, 506, and 507. 
Other provisions of this Code notwithstanding, a Group F, Division 
I Occupancy located in the basement or first story of a building hous-
ing a Group F, Division 2 or a Group H Occupancy may be classed as 
a separate and distinct building for the purpose of area limitation, 
limitation of number of stories and Type of Construction, when all of 
the following conditions are met: 
I. The Group F, Division I Occupancy is of Type I Construction. 
2. There is a Three-Hour Occupancy Separation between the 
Group F, Division I Occupancy and all portions of the Croup F, 
Division 2 or Group H Occupancy. 
3. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is devoted to the storage of 
passenger vehicles (having a capacity of not more than nine 
persons per vehicle), but may contain laundry rooms and me-
chanical equipment rooms incidental to the operation of the 
building. 
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1970 EDITION SECTIONS 1108-1109 
of the floori~ ~ny rqgm ip \ybjsb yg1PHle flpmmphle Uq11jd5 
are used or s} [d. 
Every boiler room or room containing a central heating 
phmt shall be separated from the rest of the building by not 
less than a One-Hour Fire-Resistive Occupancy Separation as 
defined in Chapter 5 with openings protected as specified in 
Section 3.320. 
EXCEPTION: Buildings not more than one story in 
height of Croup F, Division 2 Occupancy with an occupant 
load of less than 30. 
Special 
Hazards 
(Continued) 
Sec. 1109. (a) Scope. Except where speciflc provisions Open 
are made in the following Subsections, other requirements of Parking 
this Code shall apply. Garages 
(b) Definition. For the purpose of this Section, an open 
parking garage is a structure of Type I, II, or IV construction 
more than one tier in height which is at least 50 per cent 
open on two or more sides and is used exclusively for the 
parking or storage of passenger motor vehicles having a 
capacity of not more than nine persons per vehicle. 
Open parking garages are further classifled as either ramp-
access or mechanical-access. Ramp-access open parking 
garages are those employing a series of continuously rising 
Hoors or a series of interconnecting ramps between floors per-
mitting the movement of vehicles under their own power 
from and to the street level. Mechanical-access parking garages 
.ire those employing parking machines, lifts, elevators. or other 
mechanical devices for vehicles moving from and to street 
1'.·1·el and in which public occup.mcy is prohibited above the 
street level. 
( c) Construction. Construction shall be of noncombustible 
materials. Open parking garages shall meet the design re-
1 p1ireml"nts of Chapter 23. Adequate curbs and railings shall 
he- provided at every opening. 
(d) Area and Height. Area and height of open parking 
g.1rages in Fire Zones No. I, No. 2, and No. 3 shall be limited 
as set forth in Table No. 11-A except for increases allowed 
by Subsection (e). 
In structures having a spiral or sloping floor, the horizontal 
projection of the stmcture at anv cross section shall not exceed 
the allowable area per parking 'tier. In the case of a strncturc 
ho.1·ing a continuous spiral floor, each 9 feet 6 inches of height 
or portion thereof shall be considered as a tier. 
The clear height of a parking tier shall be not less than 6 
feet 6 inches, except that a lesser clear height m•lY be per-
mitted in mechanical-access open parldng garages when ap-
proved by the Building Official. 
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SECTIONS 1105-1108 
Light, 
UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
EXCEPTIO~: In storage garages and aircraft hangars 
not exceeding an area of 5000 square· feet, the Building Offi-
cial may authorize the omission of such ventilating equip· 
ment where, in his opinion, the building is supplied with un-
obstructed op~nings to the outer air which are suffici~nt to 
provide the necessary ventilation. 
Ventilation, 
and 
Sanitation 
(Continued) 
Shaft 
Enclosures 
Fire· 
Extinpishing 
Systems 
Special * Hazards 
Every building or portion thereof where persons are em-
ployed shall be provided with at least one water closet. Separ-
ate facilities shall be provided for each sex when the number 
of employees exceeds four and both sexes are employed. Such 
toilet facilities shall be located either in such building or con-
veniently in a building adjacent thereto on the same property. 
Such water closet rooms in connection with food establish-
ments where food is prepared, stored, or served, shall have a 
nonabsorbent interior finish on floors, walls, and ceilings, shall 
be separated from such food establishments with close-fitting, 
tight doors and shall have hand washing facilities therein or 
adjacent thereto. 
All water closet rooms shall be provided \dth an exterior 
window at least 3 square feet in area, fully openable; or a ver-
tical duct not less than 100 square inches in area for the first 
toilet facility with an additional .50 square inches for each ad-
ditional toilet facility; or a mechanically operated exhaust 
system, which is connected to the light switch, capable of 
providing a complete change of air every 15 minutes. Such 
systems shall be vented to the outside air and at the point of 
discharge shall be at least 5 feet from any openable window. 
For other requirements on water clo~ets, see Section 1711. 
Sec. 1106. Exits shall be enclost-cl as specified in Chap-
ter 33. 
Elevator shafts, vent shafts, and other vertical openings 
shall be enclosed, and the enclosure shall be as specified in 
Section 1706. 
· Sec. II07. When required by other provisions of this Code, 
automatic fire-extinguishing systems and standpipes shall be 
installed as specified in Chapter 38. 
Sec. ll08. Chimners and heating apparatus shall confo1m 
to the requirements of Chapter 37 of thi• Code and Uniform 
Building Code, Volume II, Mechanical. 
No storage of volatile flammable liquids shall be allowed 
in Group F Occupancies and the handling and use of gasoline, 
fuel oil and other flammable liquids shall not be pem1itted 
in any Group F Occupancy unless such use and handling 
comply with U.B.C. Standard No. 9-1. 
Devices generating a glow or flame capable of igniting 
gasoline vapor shall not be installed or used within 18 inches 
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SECTIONS 1101·1102 UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
Group F 
Occupancies 
Defined 
Construction, 
Height, and 
Allowable Area 
CHAPTER 11-REQUIREMENTS FOR GROUP F OCCUPANCIES 
NOTE: Tables in Chapter 11 appear at the end of the Chapter. 
Sec. llOl. Group F Oc:cupancies shall be: 
Division I. Gas~ipe 5ecyifG st9tj9ns storage garages \vhere 
no repair work is one except exchange of parts and main-
tenance requiring no open flame, welding, or the use of highly 
flammable liquids. 
Division 2. Wholesale and retail stores, office buildings, 
drinking and dining establishments having an occupant load 
of less than 100, printing plants, municipal police and llre 
stations, factories and workshops using materials not highly 
flammable or combustible, storage and sales rooms for com-
bustible goods, paint stores without bulk handling. (See Sec-
tion 402, for definition of Assembly Buildings.) 
Buildings or portions of buildings having rooms used for 
educational purposes, beyond the 12th grade with less than 
50 occupants in any room. 
Division 3. Aircraft hangars where no repair work is done 
except exchange of parts and maintenance requiring no open 
Bame, welding, or the use of highly flammable liquids. 
Open parking garages. 
Heliports. 
For occupancy separations see Table No. 5-B. 
For occupant load see Section 3301. 
Sec. ll02. (a) General. Buildings or parts of buildings 
classed in Group F because of the use or character of the occu· 
pancy shall be limited to the types of construction set forth 
in Tables No. 5-C and No. 5-D and shall not exceed, in area 
or height, the limits specified in Sections 505, 506, and 507. 
Other provisions of this Code notwithstanding, a Group F, 
Division l Occupancy located in the basement or flrst story 
of a building housing a Group F, Division 2 or a Group H 
Occupancy may be classed as a separate and distinct building 
for the purpose of area limitation, limitation of number of 
stories and Type of Construction, when all of the following 
conditions are met: 
1. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is of Type I Con-
struction; 
2. There is a Three-Hour Occupancy Separation between 
the Group F, Division 1 Occupancy and all portions of 
the Group F, Division 2 or Group H Occupancy. 
3. The Group F, Division 1 Occupancy is devoted to the 
storage of passenger vehicles (having a capacity of not 
more than nine persons per vehicle), but may contain 
laundry rooms and mechanical equipment rooms inci-
dental to the operation of the building. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial Court 
did not err in granting Respondent Greenwood's motion for a 
directed verdict. 
Dated this 
,/ d:r:,. 
/- day of January, 1978. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON,& DUNN 
-, / 
/ .' I . ;/"'<,~ 
, ' /l_ 't..-1 , , \ , ( ,;.}. -----
LEONARD H. RUSSON , 
Attorneys for Defendant-Responden1 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Since the supply room floor was 6 inches above the 
floor of the rest of the station, where flammables and oils 
were used, and the flame of the water heater was 16 inches 
above the supply room floor, the said water heater, even after 
Warner altered the premises prior to the fire, more than met 
the requirements of the Uniform Building Code. 
The evidence is clear, without question of fact, 
that at the time Greenwood leased the station to Warner, there 
was no violation of the Nephi City Ordinances or the 1964 
Uniform Building Code relied upon by Appellant. The heater 
in question was housed in a separate room from the rest of 
the station. Greenwood had no knowledge of what Warner used 
or stored in the supply room which housed the heater. If 
there was any violation of Nephi City Ordinances or the 1964 
Uniform Building Code, it was created when Warner, with the he! 
of Appellant Stephenson, tore down the wall separating the 
su~ply room from the rest of the station where flammables were 
used. 
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a fuel shall be separated from the 
rest of the building by not less than 
a 1 hour fire-resistive occupancy separation 
as defined in chapter S. 
The 1964 Building Code relied upon by the Appellant 
states that devices generating a flame are not to be used or 
installed within 24 inches of the floor "in any room in which 
volatile flammable liquids are used or stored." It was the 
obligation of the lessee not to store or use flammable liquids 
in the supply room where the heater was unless the heater was 
more than 24 inches above the floor. Warner testified during 
the trial that Greenwood was never in his supply room, and had 
no knowledge of what he stored or used in that room. (T. 65-67) 
Furthermore, when Warner leased the station, the 
said supply room was separated from the rest of the station by 
a wall. Warner and Appellant Stephenson, themselves, removed 
that wall. If, by the removal of the wall, a defective or 
dangerous condition was created, it was the obligation of Warner, 
the lessee, to correct the same. 
Furthermore, the 1970 Edition of the Uniform Building 
Code and the 1973 Edition of the Uniform Building Code changed 
the requirement from 24 inches to 18 inches. (See Appendix A) 
That requirement now reads: 
Devices generating a glor or flame 
capable of igniting gasoline vapors 
shall not be installed or used within 
18 inches of the floor in any room in 
which volatile flammable liquids or 
gas are used or stored. 
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Appellant, on page 8 of his brief, claims that 
Greenwood "was a principal actor" and "by affirmative conduct" 
removed the separation wall in question, therein creating a 
nuisance. This is contrary to the evidence. The evidence is 
clear, without question of fact, that Warner and Stephenson 
removed the wall in question. (T. 63-65, 85-86) 
Appellant quotes from the 1964 Uniform Building Code, 
but leaves out language which alters the meaning of the said 
section. Section 1108 states: 
Sec. 1108. Chimneys and heating apparatus 
shall conform to the requirements of 
Chapter 1 of the 1964 edition of Volume I 
of the Uniform Building Code and Chapter 
23 of this Code. 
No storage of volatile flammable liquids 
shall be allowed in Group F occupancies and 
the handling and use of gasoline, fuel oil 
and other flammable liquid shall not be 
permitted in any Group F occupancy unless 
such use and handling comply with U.B.C. 
Standard No. 9-1-64. 
Devices generating a glow or flame capable 
of igniting gasoline vapor shall not be 
installed or used within 24 inches of the 
floor in any room in which volatile flammable 
liquids are used or stored. 
Every boiler room or room containing a 
central heating plant using solid or liquid 
fuel shall be separated from the rest of 
the building by a 2 hour fire-resistive 
occupancy separation as defined in chapter 
5. Every boiler room or room containing 
a central heating plant which burns gas as 
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Respondent Greenwood submits that neither the 1951 
City Ordinances of Nephi or the 1964 Uniform Building Code, 
relied upon by Appellant, are in evidence or properly before 
the Court. Furthermore, Respondent submits that even if the 
said ordinances and building codes were in evidence, such 
have no applicability here, since the building, when leased 
to Warner, was not in violation of the same. 
B. Contrary to Claims of Appellant, Respondent 
Greenwood Did Not Create A Nuisance Nor Did He Violate Ordinance 
of Nephi City. 
Appellant makes several inaccurate statements under 
Point II of his brief. He alleges on page 7 that Greenwood 
"determined" and "caused" the wall separating the supply room 
from the lubrication bays to be removed. The evidence is clear 
that during the tenure of the lease, the lessee, Warner, asked 
Greenwood if he could remove the wall, and Greenwood said that 
he could, but left it completely up to Warner, (T. 63-64, 85-86) 
Warner, and Stephenson, the Appellant, physically removed the 
wall in question. (T. 63-65, 86) 
On page 1 of his brief, Appellant claims that 
Greenwood was the owner of the car washing equipment and water 
heater. However, the evidence is clear that Warner was the 
owner of the same. (T. 80-81, 53, 40) 
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(b) * * * 
(c) Other Proof. This rule does not 
prevent the proof of official records 
or of entry or lack of entry therein 
by any method authorized by any applicable 
statute or by the rules of evidence at 
common law. 
(d) Certified Copy of Record Read in 
Evidence. A copy of any official record, 
or entry therein, in the custody of a 
public officer of this state, or of the 
United States, certified by the officer 
having custody thereof, to be a full, true 
and correct copy of the original in his 
custody, may be read in evidence in an 
action or proceeding in the courts of this 
state, in like manner and with like effect 
as the original could be if produced. 
At no time, during the trial or after, was the 
official publication of the ordinances, or a copy attested to 
by the official having custody, or his deputy, offered into evic 
as required by Rule 44(a). 
A~no time, during the trial or after, was a copy of 
the official record, certified by the custodian to be a full 
and true and correct copy of the same, read into evidence as 
require4 by Rule 44(d). 
At no time, during the evidenciary portion of the tri: 
or thereafter, was any testimony or evidence offered as to 
amendments, or lack thereof, to the 1951 Nephi Ordinances, or a: 
to the foundation of the 1951 ordinances, or as to the adoption 
of the 1964 Uniform Building Code relied upon by Appellant, or 
of subsequent Uniform Building Codes. 
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The Utah Rules of Evidence further declare that 
the determination as to whether or not judicial notice be granted 
"shall be a matter for the judge and not for the jury." (Rule 
10(4) Utah Rules of Evidence.) 
Rule 44, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as 
Rule 68 of the Rules of Evidence, set forth the requirements 
of proof of official records. Official record is defined by 
the said rules to mean "all public writings, including laws, 
judicial records, all official documents, and public records 
of private writings." The said rule provides: 
44. (a) Authentication of Copy. An 
official record or an entry therein, when 
admissible for any purpose, may be 
evidenced by an official publication thereof 
or by a copy attested by the official 
having legal custody of the record, or 
by his deputy, and in the absence of 
judicial knowledge or competent evidence, 
accompanied with a certificate that such 
officer has the custody. If the office 
in which the record is kept is within 
the United States or within a territory 
or insular possession subject to the 
dominion of the United States, the certificate 
may be made by a judge of a court of record 
of the district or political subdivision 
in which the record is kept, authenticated 
by the seal of his office. If the office 
in which the record is kept is in a foreign 
state or country, the certificate may be 
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, 
counsul general, consul, vice consul, or 
consular agent or by any officer in the 
foreign service of the United States stationed 
in the foreign state or country in which 
the record is dept, and authenticated by 
the seal of his office. 
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At no time during the evidenciary portion of the 
trial did Appellant Stephenson offer into evidence the Ordinanc; 
of Nephi City or Building Codes adopted by Nephi City. Only 
after Respondent Greenwood moved for a directed verdict did 
Appellant refer to the Nephi City Ordinances and ask the Trial 
Court to take judicial notice of the same. Appellant offered 
no foundation or testimony for such ordinances, nor did he offe 
to place the published ordinance book into evidence. Appellant 
attorney merely read from an old book in his hands, which he 
identified as a 1951 volume of ordinances, and a 1964 Uniform 
Building Code, and claimed that such were applicable in 1973. 
(T. 169) 
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the Trial 
Judge shall take judicial notice of duly enacted ordinances if 
the requesting party "furnishes the judge sufficient informatic 
to enable him to comply with the request," and if the requestir. 
party "has given each adverse party such notice as the judge 
may require to enable the adverse party to prepare to meet 
the request." Rule 9(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
Judicial notice shall be taken of each 
matter specified in paragraph (2) of 
this rule if a party requests it, and 
(a) furnishes the judge sufficient infor-
mation to enable him properly to comply 
with the request and (b) has given each 
adverse party such notice as the judge 
may require to enable the adverse party 
to prepare to meet the request. 
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Uniform Building Code was adopted by Nephi City, and required 
such heating element to be 24 inches above the floor of any 
room where flammables are used or stored. The Appellant 
refers to Nephi City Ordinances dated 1951, which adopted the 
1949 Edition of the Uniform Building Code. However, for some 
strange reason, the Appellant then refers to the 1964 Short 
Form Edition of the Uniform Building Code, and claims, without 
evidence or foundation, that the same was used by Nephi City 
and is applicable in this case. (Appellant's Brief P. 6) 
(It should be noted that the 1970 and 1973 Uniform 
Building Codes changed the earlier requirement, and require the 
heating element to be 18 inches above the floor of any room 
in which flammables are stored or used. (See Appendix A) If 
such codes are applicable, the water heater was not in violation 
of such codes even after the wall was removed by Warner, since 
the supply room floor was 6 inches higher than the rest of 
the service station, which would give a total height of 22 
inches, well above the 18 inch requirement. Of course, if 
Warner stored or used flammables in the storeroom area, then 
there could be a violation, but this does not concern the 
landlord, Greenwood, who had no knowledge of what Warner used 
the storeroom are for or what was stored there.] (See Appendix A) 
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POINT II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF NEPHI CITY 
ORDINANCES BEFORE THE COURT; NOR IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
RESPONDENT GREENWOOD VIOLATED ANY NEPHI CITY ORDINANCES. 
Since the station was not defective when leased to 
Warner, and since the only alleged violation of city ordinances 
was created by Warner, the lessee, the Nephi City Ordinances 
and Uniform Building Code are immaterial and irrelevant in 
this appeal. However, Respondent is compelled to respond to 
Appellant's claims in this regard. 
The Appellant, is Point II of his brief, and contrary 
to the record and transcript, alleges that the landlord, Green~ 
remodled his building and "installed" the car washing equipment 
contrary to the applicable building code of Nephi City and is, 
therefore, "guilty of affirmative wrongful condict" and 
"creates a nuisance." The Appellant also alleges, contrary to 
all evidence, that Greenwood removed the separating wall, 
thereby exposing the water heater to the lubrication bay, thus 
constituting a nuisance. The allegations made by the Appellant 
are incorrect, and in some instances, totally false, as evidenc 
by the testimony contained within the transcript. 
A. There is No Evidence of the Nephi City Ordinance~ 
Before the Court. 
The water heater heating element was 16 inches above 
the supply room floor. (T. 71-72) Appellant claims that the 
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represents an exception to the general 
principles governing liability of a 
lessor to his tenant's patrons, considering 
the element of control, and this is 
quite obvious, since the decision itself 
cited many cases enunciating the general 
rule and then indicated clearly that 
this shooting gallery situation was an 
exception thereto--almost in the same 
category as a spring gun, so to speak. 
We think that case, relied upon almost 
entirely by plaintiff, is inapropos 
under the facts of the instant case. 
We prefer to refer the reader to cases 
of our court which more nearly fit the 
circumstances of the case here, which 
we believe to be controlling. 
(The Supreme Court cited Wilson v. 
Woodruff, 65 Ut. 118, 235 P. 368, and 
Reams v. Taylor, 31 Ut. 288, 87 P. 1089.) 
It is clear from the evidence, and without any question 
of fact, that when Greenwood leased the station to Warner, 
the same was free from defect or nuisance. If a defect or 
nuisance existed at the time of the accident, such was created 
by Warner and Appellant Stephenson when they tore down the 
wall that separated the storage room from the rest of the 
station. 
It is submitted that even if the alleged defect had 
existed at the time of the lease, the landlord could not be 
held liable. But the alleged defect having come into existence 
by the actions of the lessee, Warner, it is even more certain 
that the Trial Court did not err in granting Respondent Greenwood 
motion for a directed verdict. 
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building collapsed, injuring one lessee and killing another, 
and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a non-suit in favor of 
the landlord-lessor. The Court stated: 
The general proposition is well settled 
that in the absence of warranty, deceipt, 
or fraud on the part of the landlord, 
the lessee takes the risk of the quality 
of the premises, and cannot make the 
landlord answerable for any injury sustained 
by him during his occupancy by reason of 
the defective condition of the premises or 
their faulty construction .. 
In Montoya v. Berthana Investment Corp., supra, an 
action was brought against the lessor, as well as the lessee, 
of a skating rink, to recover for the death of a minor child. 
It was alleged that the lessor was negligent in leasing premise~ 
which contained a dangerous condition, wherein an armrest of 
a chair protruded out into the skating rink floor, creating a n 
danger for patrons, and also in allowing the lessee to operate 
the rink in that condition. The appellant in that case relied~, 
upon Larson v. Calder, supra, but the Utah Supreme Court held 
that that case did not apply, and reaffirmed the principles c 
set forth in Wilson v. Woodruff, supra. The Court stated: 
The facts in Larson v. Calder and the 
decisions therein, are so far afield 
from the instant case as to preclude 
that case from being any authority here. 
There, a lessor leased a shooting gallery 
to a tenant. The shooting gallery's 
backstop had holes and cracks through which 
anyone with common sense would know presented 
a highly dangerous hazard to those who 
might be using a walk on the other side 
of a wooden backstop, oblivious to the 
danger which a lessor reasonably should 
have known to exist. Larson v. Calder 
-15-
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1105·1108 
storage garages and aircraft hangars not exceeding an area of 5000 
square feet, the Building Official may authorize the omission of such 
ventilating equipment where, in his opinion, the building is supplied 
with unobstructed openings to the outer air which are sufficient to pro-
vide the necessary ventilation. 
Every building or portion thereof where persons are employed shall 
be provided with at least one water closet. Separate facilities shall be 
provided for each sex when the number of employees exceeds four and 
both sexes are employed. Such toilet facilities shall be located either 
in such building or conveniently in a building adjacent thereto on the 
same property. 
Such water closet rooms in connection with food establishments 
"here food is prepared, stored, or served, shall have a nonabsorbent 
interior finish on floors, walls, and ceilings and shall have hand washing 
facilities therein or adjacent thereto. 
All water closet rooms shall be provided with an exterior window 
at least 3 square feet in area, fully openable; or a vertical duct not less 
than 100 square inches in area for the first toilet facility with an addi-
tional 50 square inches for each additional toilet facility; or a mechani-
cally operated e.xhaust system, which is connected to the light switch, 
capable of providing a complete change of air every 15 minutes. Such 
S) stems shall be vented to the outside air and at the point of discharge 
shall be at least 5 feet from any openable window. 
For other requirements on water closets, sec Section 1711. 
Shaft Enclosures 
Sec. 1106. Exits shall be enclosed as specified in Chapter 33. 
Elevator shafts, vent shafts, and other vertical openings shall be 
enclosed, and the enclosure shall be as specified in Section 1706. 
Fire-extinguishing Systems 
Sec. 1107. When required by other provisions of this Code, automat-
ic fire-extinguishing systems and standpipes shall be installed as spe-
cified in Chapter 38. 
Special Hazards 
Sec. 1108. Chimneys and heating apparatus shall conform to the 
requirements of Chapter 37- of this Code and the Mechanical Code 
No storage of volatile flammable liquids shall be allowed in Group 
F Occupancies and the handling and use of gasoline, fuel oil and other 
Aammable liquids shall not be permitted in any Group F Occupancy 
unless such use and handling comply with U.B.C. Standard No. 10-1. 
Devices generating a glow or Harne capable of igniting gasoline 
vapor shall not be installed or used within · s th · 
r ' 
Every room containing a boiler or central heating plant shall be 1 
separated from the rest of the building by not less than a One-Hour 
Fire-Resistive Occupancy Separation. 
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